What are the effects of strengthening developing countries' protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth, social welfare and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. We find that the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality while the South experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. As for global welfare, there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global welfare decreases (increases). In light of these findings, we discuss policy implications on China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.
Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) establishes a minimum level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection that must be provided by all member countries by 2006. Given that developed countries (the North) generally had a much higher level of IPR protection than developing countries (the South) prior to TRIPS, this agreement is likely to have asymmetric effects on the North and the South. As an example of the North (the South), we consider the US (China). Table 1 presents the index of patent rights from Park (2008) for the US and China.
1 It shows that as a result of TRIPS, the level of patent protection in China is converging towards the level in the US. 2 Given the importance of TRIPS, this study analyzes its effects on economic growth, social welfare and income inequality in the global economy. Specifically, we develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity among households. In the model, both the North and the South invest in R&D, but the North has a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. Within this framework, we derive the following results.
Firstly, strengthening patent protection in either country increases both countries' (a) economic growth by increasing R&D and (b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. Then, following Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) , we derive the pre-TRIPS Nash equilibrium level of patent protection that is sub-optimally low due to the positive externality of patent policy. Also, we find that the North chooses a higher level of patent protection than the South and imposing the North's higher level of patent protection on the South as required by TRIPS increases (decreases) welfare in the North (the South).
This welfare implication is consistent with Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) . It is perhaps not surprising that the South would be worse off by deviating from its best response. Therefore, the intriguing question is whether TRIPS would improve or reduce global welfare. We find that there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global welfare is lower (higher) under TRIPS while Lai and Qiu (2003) find that global welfare always improves as a result of TRIPS.
This difference arises because we introduce a structural parameter to allow for varying degrees of crosscountry spillovers captured by the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. In our model, the degree of the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium is determined by this structural parameter.
When the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small, cross-country spillovers of innovation are small as well. In this case, imposing the North's level of patent protection on the South makes the South worse off without making the North much better off. This finding has important policy implications.
First, it implies that the North is not always able to compensate the South even in the presence of costless transfers. Secondly, a sufficient degree of global integration is necessary in order for the harmonization of IPR protection to improve global welfare.
Furthermore, our model with heterogeneous households enables us to analyze the effects of TRIPS on income inequality within each country in addition to growth and welfare. Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher growth and higher welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality.
Intuitively, a higher growth rate increases the rate of return on assets through the Euler equation, and this higher return on assets increases the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households in each country. This result suggests that although the representative-agent welfare analysis of TRIPS in previous studies can be robust to an extension with heterogeneous households, it is useful to also analyze the distributional consequences within a country given that income inequality can be a social concern.
For example, China amended its patent law in 2000 in anticipation of its accession to the WTO in 2001. 4 Since this amendment, the annual growth rate of applications for invention patents in China has increased to 23% (compared to less than 10% before 2000). Hu and Jefferson (2009) provide empirical evidence to show that the patent-law amendment in 2000 is a major factor for China's recent surge in patenting activities. Also, R&D as a share of GDP in China increases from an average of about 0.7% in the 90's to 1.49% in 2007. 5 At the same time, the rising income inequality in China poses the country a serious challenge on domestic stability. In 2007, China's Gini coefficient rises to 0.47 that is above the threshold of 0.45 indicating potential social unrest. Our theoretical analysis suggests that strengthening IPR protection in China as a result of TRIPS worsens its income inequality in addition to potentially reducing its social welfare as also implied by previous studies. Given the current situation in China, the distributional consequence seems to be more alarming. In a panel regression, Adams (2008) finds that strengthening IPR protection indeed has a positive and statistically significant effect on income inequality.
His estimates imply that increasing Park's (2008) index by one (on a scale of zero to five) is associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 to 0.02 (on a scale of zero to one) in developing countries.
We should emphasize that there are also other important factors contributing to the rising income inequality in China, and patent policy is only one of them. Furthermore, China's accession to the WTO carries other benefits, such as lower trade barriers, which are not considered in this partial analysis of patent policy. In the model, we introduce a parameter to capture trade barriers and find that lower trade barriers improve social welfare. Therefore, a complete welfare analysis on China's accession to the WTO should trade off the welfare gain from lower trade barriers against the welfare loss from TRIPS.
Our study relates to the literature on IPR protection and North-South trade. Early studies in this literature focus on the effects of IPR in reducing imitation from the South and encouraging technology transfer from the North through licensing or foreign direct investment. In these studies, innovative activities are usually assumed to take place only in the North. 6 However, two other important reasons for strengthening IPR in the South are (a) to provide incentives for the North to develop technologies that are also used by the South, 7 and (b) to provide incentives for the South to invest in innovative activities. 8 To fill in this gap in the literature, recent theoretical studies, such as Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) , have started to consider the important role of TRIPS in providing sufficient incentives for innovation in both the North and the South. Our paper follows this branch of studies to focus on this aspect of TRIPS. Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent
protection in an open-economy variety-expanding model, in which both the North and the South invest in R&D, and analyze the welfare effects of harmonizing IPR protection. We complement these interesting studies by analyzing the effects of TRIPS on the growth-inequality tradeoff in a quality-ladder model with endogenous growth and by allowing for varying degrees of cross-country spillovers. To our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the effects of TRIPS on welfare, growth and inequality simultaneously.
Modeling varying degrees of cross-country spillovers also has surprising implications on global welfare.
Since the seminal study of Simon Kuznets (1955) , the tradeoff between growth and inequality has been an important issue in economics. On one hand, early theoretical and empirical studies tend to find a negative growth-inequality relationship. 9 On the other hand, the more recent studies tend to find a positive relationship. 10 Forbes (2000) finds a positive empirical growth-inequality relationship and argues that the different results in previous studies are due to omitted-variable bias and measurement error. Turnovsky (2006, 2007) argue that the theoretical growth-inequality relationship should be 6 See Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993) , Lai (1998) , Yang and Maskus (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002b) . While Glass and Saggi (2002a) consider a model with two symmetric innovating countries, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) consider a model in which Northern firms invest in innovative R&D and their Southern affiliates invest in adaptive R&D for technology transfer from the North. 7 See, for example, Diwan and Rodrik (1991) . 8 For example, in a panel regression, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) find that strengthening IPR in developing countries indeed has a positive and significant effect on their innovations. 9 See Galor and Zeira (1993) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) . 10 See Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Benabou (1996) , Galor and Tsiddon (1997) , Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) . Barro (2000) finds a positive (negative) growth-inequality relationship in developed (developing) countries.
ambiguous and depends on the underlying structural changes. Incorporating wealth heterogeneity into an AK growth model, they show that a positive relationship is more likely to emerge.
Although the capital-accumulation-driven growth models are useful frameworks for analyzing many macroeconomic issues, they are not suitable for evaluating innovation policies. Therefore, this study incorporates wealth heterogeneity into an open-economy R&D-based growth model to analyze the effects of TRIPS. In a related study, Chu (2010) analyzes the effects of patent policy on the growthinequality tradeoff in the US using a closed-economy quality-ladder model with wealth heterogeneity.
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The present study differs from Chu (2010) Turnovsky (2010), "…virtually the entire growth-inequality literature is restricted to a closed economy, which is a severe shortcoming given the increasing openness characterizing most economies."
This paper also relates to the literature on R&D underinvestment, patent policy and economic growth. Griliches (1992) provides a survey on empirical studies that find the social return to R&D to be much higher than the private return. Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) use these empirical estimates to
show that in an R&D-based growth model, the socially optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times higher than the market level. A number of studies, such as Li (2001) , O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Chu (2009) , analyze how patent breadth increases R&D and economic growth in R&D-based growth models that feature a representative household. Given that patent policy may affect the distribution of income, the present study contributes to this literature by providing a growth-theoretic framework that highlights the distributional consequences of patent policy in an open economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 considers the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for future research.
The model
The underlying quality-ladder model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991a) . We modify the model by (a) extending it to a two-country setting with trade in intermediate inputs similar to Peng et al. (2006) , (b) allowing for wealth heterogeneity among households, and (c) considering incomplete patent breadth (i.e., patent protection against imitation) as in Li (2001) . 12 There are two countries denoted by the North (n) and the South (s). As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) , both countries invest in R&D, but the North has a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. Also, trade is balanced as commonly assumed in the literature. Given that the quality-ladder growth model has been well-studied, the familiar components of the model will be briefly described in Sections 2.1 to 2.4. To conserve space, we only present the equations for the North. However, the readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation that we present, there is an analogous equation for the South.
Households
There is a continuum of identical households (except for the initial holding of wealth) on the unit interval
in each of the two countries indexed by a superscript } , { s n ∈ . Households are immobile across countries. In country n, household h's utility function is given by
denotes the consumption of household h in country n at time t. 0 > ρ is the exogenous discount rate. Each household maximizes utility subject to the following law of motion for asset accumulation.
12 Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) consider patent protection in the form of patent length in their variety-expanding models. Given that we have a quality-ladder model, we consider patent protection in the form of patent breadth, which is an equally important patent-policy instrument commonly discussed in the patent-design literature. Using China as an example, its statutory length of patent has been 20 years since 1993. 13 In a similar (closed-economy) model, Chu (2010) considers a more general iso-elastic utility function and shows that the positive relationship between patent protection and income inequality is robust to this specification change. To simplify the analytical derivation, we focus on the log utility function in this study.
is the value of financial assets owned by household h in country n at time t. Household h's share of financial assets at time 0 is exogenously given by
function with a mean of one and a standard deviation of n v σ (i.e., the coefficient of variation of wealth).
n t R is the nominal rate of return on assets in country n. We assume home bias in asset holding such that the shares of monopolistic firms in each country are solely owned by domestic households.
14 Household h inelastically supplies one unit of labor to earn a wage income n t W . n t P is the price of consumption in country n. From household h's intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is given by
is the real interest rate in country n. Equation (3) shows that consumption of households within a country grows at the same rate.
Final goods
Consumption in country n is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of two types of final goods. Later on, we will show that this parameter also determines the degree of cross-country spillovers. There is 14 It is useful to note that home bias does not eliminate the positive externality of IPR protection in generating profits to be earned by foreign households. When a country strengthens IPR protection, foreign firms owned by foreign households still earn a larger amount of profits. What home bias does is to naturally link the degree of this positive externality to the share of goods traded, which is determined by the domestic importance of foreign goods. 15 This type of Armington aggregator is commonly used in open-economy macroeconomic models for aggregating tradable goods across countries. A more general form of Armington aggregator is of the CES form, which we do not consider because we want to allow 
refers to intermediate goods i (in country n) that are produced by inputs from country s.
Intermediate goods
In country n, there is a continuum of industries indexed by 
is the exogenous step size of quality improvement from each innovation, and
is the number of innovations that have occurred in industry i of country n as of time t. In other words, Similarly, using the leader's input
denotes an iceberg transportation cost that captures trade barriers.
To produce one unit of
, the industry leader needs to employ one unit of workers. Therefore, the production function is
is the total number of workers employed in industry i of country n. The leader's marginal cost of producing one unit of
. Implicitly, we have assumed that the industry leader must employ domestic workers to produce for both domestic and foreign markets and abstracted from the issues of foreign direct investment, licensing and overseas imitation in order to keep the model tractable.
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As commonly assumed in quality-ladder models, the current and former industry leaders engage in Bertrand competition, and the familiar profit-maximizing price for the current industry leader is a constant markup over the marginal cost. The prices for
captures the level of patent breadth in country n (s). In Grossman and Helpman (1991a) , there is complete patent protection against imitation (i.e., 18 Due to incomplete patent breadth, the former leader can partly imitate the current leader's invention in order to increase the quality of her product by a factor of
) in country n (s) without infringing the current leader's patents. As a result, the limit-pricing markups for the current leader 17 These interesting issues have been studied in a related literature. See Grossman and Helpman (1991b) , Helpman (1993) , Lai (1998) , Yang and Maskus (2001) , Glass and Saggi (2002a, b) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) . 
R&D
Denote the expected value of an innovation in industry i of country n as ) ( i V n t . Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification in (5) and (6), the amount of profits is the same across industries within a country (i.e., ) (
features an equal innovation arrival rate across industries within a country. 19 We denote the sum of profits generated by an innovation in country n as There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by
in each country, and they hire workers for R&D. The expected profit for entrepreneur j in country n is This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D within each country.
Decentralized equilibrium
In this section, we define the equilibrium and show that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path. In Section 3.1, we show that the wealth distribution is stationary. In Section 3.2, we consider the income distribution. In Section 3.3, we derive a welfare function for policymakers and characterize the Nash equilibrium as well as the globally optimal patent protection.
Equilibrium is a time path of prices , we impose a lower bound on R&D productivity. 20 To be more precise, we are referring to final goods produced using foreign intermediate inputs. 21 These price indices will be defined in the proof of Lemma 1.
Condition R (R&D productivity):
Given the equilibrium allocation of labor, the next lemma characterizes the equilibrium outcomes for other aggregate variables. In (19), the arrival rate of innovation is increasing in domestic R&D. In (20), the growth rate of consumption in country n is increasing in the arrival rate of innovation in each country.
Therefore, an increase in 
Wealth distribution
I adopt a similar approach as in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) to show that the distribution of wealth is stationary on the balanced growth path. The value of wealth in country n evolves according to (22) n t n t n t n t n t n t
Combining (2) 
for all t. Lemma 3 summarizes the stationarity of the wealth distribution in country n.
Lemma 3: For every household h in country n,
Proof: Proven in the text.■
Income distribution
In this section, we derive a measure of income inequality. We consider inequality in real income, which is the appropriate measure because it is invariant to the unit of denomination. Household h's real income ) (h Y n t is the sum of the real return on financial assets and the real wage rate given by (26) n t n t n t n t n t n t
From (3), (15) and Lemma 3, the share of real income earned by household h simplifies to ). This positive relationship between growth and inequality is consistent with recent empirical studies, such as Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) . Next, we consider the effects of an exogenous increase in patent protection on growth and income inequality. Corollary 1 shows that a higher level of patent protection in either country increases R&D, economic growth and income inequality in both countries. (28) indicates an interesting difference between the AK model and the quality-ladder model. The AK model in Turnovsky (2006, 2007) requires elastic labor supply to generate an endogenous income distribution while the quality-ladder model generates an endogenous income distribution even with inelastic labor supply. See Chu (2010) for a quality-ladder model with heterogeneous households and elastic labor supply.
Social welfare
Due to the balanced-growth behavior of the model, the utility of household h in country n simplifies to
The lifetime utility of a household depends on the growth rate and the initial level of consumption, which in turn depends on the initial real wage rate and the share of assets owned by the household. Although the ownership of assets varies across households, (30) shows that this household-specific term is independent of patent protection. This property is a result of the log utility function, and this convenient feature allows us to abstract from choosing a social welfare function for the government. . As in Grossman and Lai (2004) , the policymaker in each country chooses the domestic level of patent protection once and for all at time 0 to maximize domestic households' welfare in (33) taking the foreign level of patent protection as given. In other words, the policymakers in the two countries play a one-shot game at time 0. Also, we assume an interior solution for the equilibrium level of patent protection such that z < μ (i.e., 1 < b ) in each country.
Lemma 4: After dropping the exogenous terms, the initial real wage in country n can be decomposed into

Proposition 2: The Nash equilibrium level of patent protection is given by
Proof: See Appendix A.■ As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) , we find that the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection is stronger in the North than in the South unless either (a)
We assume that neither (a) nor (b) hold such that 
Proposition 3:
The globally optimal level of patent protection is given by Corollary 2 shows that the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection deviates from the globally optimal level as α increases because the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium is increasing in α .
Intuitively, a larger degree of cross-country spillovers raises the degree of positive externality and hence worsens the sub-optimality of the Nash equilibrium.
Effects of TRIPS
In this section, we analyze the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality. . In summary, we find that the North experiences higher growth, higher welfare and higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth, lower welfare and higher income inequality. Under TRIPS, the South's level of patent protection increases from which global welfare under TRIPS is lower (higher) than in the Nash equilibrium. In other words, there must be a sufficient degree of global integration in order for a harmonization of IPR protection to improve global welfare.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality simultaneously. In summary, strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of TRIPS increases global economic growth but also worsens global income inequality. Whether it increases global welfare depends on the degree of cross-country spillovers. To derive these results, we incorporate wealth heterogeneity among households into an open-economy quality-ladder model. Our model belongs to the class of firstgeneration R&D-based growth models that exhibit scale effects (i.e., a larger economy experiences faster growth). We eliminate scale effects by normalizing each country's population size to unity.
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In our model, we have abstracted from some interesting issues, such as licensing, foreign direct investment, and North-South product cycles. In reality, both of (a) technology transfer from the North to the South and (b) providing sufficient incentives for the South to innovate are important reasons for strengthening IPR in the South. For analytical tractability and the relative lack of attention to the latter issue in the literature, we follow Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) to focus on (b) only. Therefore, one direction for future research is to account for these issues in a model with heterogeneous households. Furthermore, given that the enforcement of IPR is as important as the statutory law in reality, it would be interesting for future studies to consider IPR enforcement as well.
Although our model is designed to analyze the positive externality associated with IPR protection in developed and developing countries, the two countries in the model can easily be relabeled as two 25 The literature has two other ways of dealing with scale effects (a) the semi-endogenous growth model and (b) the second-generation model that combines quality improvement and variety expansion. Our model's implication that devoting a larger share of labor to R&D would increase growth is consistent with the second-generation models. See, for example, Jones (1999) for a discussion on scale effects in R&D-based growth models. developed countries by assuming that they have similar levels of R&D productivity. In this case, the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection continues to be lower than the globally optimal level as long as α is greater than zero. In other words, a coordination failure of patent policy can exist even among developed countries suggesting the importance of also evaluating whether the level of IPR protection chosen by developed countries is indeed optimal from the perspective of global welfare.
Finally, in our model, income inequality is generated by an unequal distribution of (financial) capital income, and patent policy affects income inequality through the rate of return on assets. Therefore, even if inventions do not represent a significant share of assets in reality, 26 the effect of patent policy on income inequality can still be significant in the presence of other capital incomes that depend on the real interest rate. Although the prevailing wisdom is that income inequality is mainly caused by an increase in the skill premium (i.e., the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers), some studies, such as
Atkinson (2000, 2003) , argue that inequality in capital income is also playing an increasingly important role. For example, Reed and Cancian (2001) show that capital income contributes to one quarter of the increase in income inequality in the US in the 90's while it accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase in the 70's. Therefore, the current study also serves the purpose of providing an open-economy R&D-based growth model that highlights the increasing importance of capital income on income inequality.
Proof of Lemma 1:
In this proof, we first show that aggregate expenditure on consumption n t n t n t C P E ≡ in country n always jumps immediately to a unique and stable steady-state value. Then, we show that this steady-state value determines a unique and stationary equilibrium allocation of labor in country n.
Choosing labor as the numeraire in country n (i.e., 1 = Using its definition, the law of motion for aggregate expenditure on consumption is given by 
. Similarly, the price index for
. From (5), (7) and (9), the aggregate production function for
Similarly, from (6), (8) and (9), the aggregate production function for . As α increases above α , the opposite is true.■
